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Humans are responsible for the most rapid process of extinction
of species in the history of the planet. The common estimate of the rate
of extinction is one species every fifteen minutes.1 This has led to
increasing recognition of the importance of biodiversity, defined as:
* Professor of Law, University of Washington. Faculty Chair, Center for Environmental
Law and Policy.
t J.D. Candidate, 1995, University of Washington School of Law. Managing Editor,
Washington Law Review. The authors wish to acknowledge receipt of a summer research grant
from the University of Washington School of Law which aided in the writing of this Article.
1. WnMH. RoDGEs, JR., ENVmONMENrALLAw 995 (2d ed. 1994). In 1973 when the
ESA was being considered by Congress, the Committee was "informed that species were still being
lost at the rate of about one per year... and 'the pace of disappearance of species' appeared to be
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Mhe variety of organisms considered at all levels, from
genetic variants belonging to the same species through
arrays of species to arrays of genera, families, and still
higher taxonomic levels, includ[ing] the variety of
ecosystems, which comprise both the communities of
organisms within particular habitats and the physical
conditions under which they live.2
Congress has expressed its concern over the extinction of species in the
Endangered Species Act (ESA),3 but the effectiveness of the Act has been
somewhat limted-witness the extinction in 1987 of the Dusky Sparrow,
listed under the ESA.4 In addition, national policy as expressed in
numerous federal and state laws extends protection to wildlife long before
these creatures or plants become endangered. 5 New avenues are needed
if we are successfully to preserve biodiversity. The public trust doctrine
provides such a new avenue and fills a critical need.
The public trust doctrine is an ancient Roman legal doctrine that
has been applied in both England and the Umted States. The doctrine
traditionally addressed questions of public access to and use of
commercially navigable waters for navigation, fisheries and various other
uses of the underlying seabeds, lake bottoms, and nverbeds.6 In recent
years, the public trust doctrine has been invoked to protect birds and other
wildlife, water quality, ecological and environmental values, and different
types of recreation. 7 Although no public trust case has applied the
doctrine to protect biodiversity per se, it seems clear by analogy to
existing case law that the doctrine could be an effective tool for protecting
biodiversity, particularly where the species at issue are aquatic or
associated with riparian ecosystems. This article will examine why the
public trust doctrine is important for the protection of biodiversity and
what it might accomplish.
'accelerating."' Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 176 (1978) (citing H.R. No. 93-412,
at 4 (1973)). "The value of this genetic heritage is, quite literally, incalculable." 133 CONG. RE.
HI1,248-02 (1987).
2. EmWARD O. WiSON, TiEDvERsrr" oFLim 393 (1992).
3. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (1988).
4. RoD ERs, supra note 1, at 1023.
5. See mfra notes 37-53 and accompanying text.
6. Orion Corp. v. State, 747 P.2d 1062,1072 (Wash. 1987).
7. Id. at 1073.
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I. THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF TE DOCTRINE
The public trust doctrine originated from the widespread practice
of using navigable waters as public highways for navigation, commerce,
and fisheries.8 It was first articulated in the Institutes of Justiian in 533
C.E.9 In England, the first recorded reference to something resembling
the public trust doctrine appeared in the Magna Carta.10 The public trust
was one of the mcidents of sovereignty-perceived as an aspect of natural
law existing outside the confines of any constitution or other
government-enabling or limiting document like the Magna Carta. In
the United States, where the states hold title to the beds of navigable
streams, it was earlier applied to the beds of fresh water bodies, as well as
to the seabed.11
In his widely cited article, Professor Joseph Sax summarized what
he called the central substantive thought in public trust litigation:
"[wihen a state holds a resource which is available for the free use of the
general public, a court will look with considerable skepticism upon any
governmental conduct which is calculated either to reallocate that
resource to more restricted uses or to subject public uses to the self-
interest of private parties.' 12 Expanding and clarifying his analysis, he
proposed a four-prong test to determine whether a governmental act is
inconsistent with the trust: (1) whether public property has been disposed
of at less than market value where there is no obvious reason for a
subsidy; (2) whether the governmental action grants a private interest the
authority to make resource-use decisions that may subordinate broad
public resource uses to that private interest; (3) whether an attempt has
been made to reallocate diffuse public uses either to private uses or to
public uses which have less breadth; and (4) whether the resource is being
used for its natural purpose.13 The last three of these criteria would fit the
protection of biodiversity.
8. Id. at 1072-73.
9. J. INsT., 2.1.1-2.1.6 (P. Birks & G. McLeod trans. 1987) ('The things which are
naturally everybody's are: air, flowing water, the sea, and seashore.").
10. See Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367,410 (1842). "The question must be
regarded as settled in England against the right of the king since Magna Carta to make such a
grant." Id.
11. See e g., uifra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
12. Joseph L. Sax, Te Public Trust Doctnne m Natural Resource: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 IMcm L. Rsv. 471,490 (1970).
13. Id at 562-65.
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I. THE PuBLic TRusT DOCTRINE IN THE UN STATES: IT Is
NEARLY INDES' UCIMLE
Early U.S. cases followed the public trust doctrine.14 These cases
established the power of the doctrine by making it difficult, if not
impossible, to destroy public trust interests. This is an important quality
that relates to protection of biodiversity In Arnold v. Mundy, the court
said the sovereign could not "make a direct and absolute grant of the
waters of the state [to a private citizen], divesting all the citizens of their
common right."'i s In 1892, the United States Supreme Court applied the
doctrine in Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois16 and held that the
Illinois State legislature did not have constitutional power to convey
absolute title to the bed of Chicago Harbor to a railroad. Despite duly
(and probably corruptly) enacted state legislation, the title was at least
voidable, if not void. The public trust doctrine creates a fiduciary duty for
the state that, according to the Illinois Central court, "can never be lost,
except as to such parcels as are used in promoting the interests of the
public therein... -"17 That analysis implied a scrutiny of government and
private conduct akin to the most strict scrutiny reserved for matters of
constitutional import. Indeed, the legislature may act in derogation of the
trust only when its acts are closely tailored to a legitimate governmental
purpose related to the nature of the trust, such as construction in aid of
public trust interests. 18 The Califorma Supreme Court, ruling on the trust
as it applies to tidelands, described the doctrine in similar terms in City of
Berkeley v. Superior Court of Alameda County.19 Reasoning from the
premise that the state does not have the power to abdicate its fiduciary
responsibilities in favor of a private party, the court said:
[S]tatutes purporting to authorize an abandonment of ...
public use will be carefully scanned to ascertain whether
or not such was the legislative intention and that intent
must be clearly expressed or necessarily implied. It will
not be implied if any other inference is reasonably
14. See Arnold v. Mundy, 6 NJ.L. 1 (NI. 1821); Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146
U.S. 387 (1982); City of Berkeley v. Superior Court of Alameda County, 606 P.2d 362 (Cal.
1980); and Orion Corp. v. State, 747 P.2d 1062 (Wash. 1987).
15. 6 N.iL. 1,78 (NJ. 1821).
16. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
17. Id at 453.
18. Id. at 435.
19. 606 P.2d 362 (Cal. 1980).
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possible. And if any interpretation of the statute is
reasonably possible which would not involve a
destruction of the public use or an intention to terminate it
in violation of the trust, the courts will give the statute
such interpretation.20
Like the Illinois Central court, the City of Berkeley court describes a level
of scrutiny usually reserved for constitutional issues. Thus, the public
trust doctrine defines the nature of property at its roots, prior even to
constitutional analysis. This becomes especially important when the
courts begin to apply the public trust doctrine to protect biodiversity.
The Washington Supreme Court, not known for its reckless
disregard for property rights, has affirmed the power of the public trust
doctrine in similar terms. In Orion Corp. v. State, the court asserted that
the "public trust doctrine has always existed in Washington' and that it
applies to privately as well as publicly owned land.2 1 The tidelands here
were privately owned. Orion had purchased the tidelands and had
planned to build a major Venetian style housing development but was
denied that opportunity by county zoning laws which required the
tidelands to be left in their natural state. Since the privately owned
tidelands were subject to a public trust easement held by the state, the
court remanded the case to determine whether a taking had occurred.22
The court also ruled that the public trust doctrine is based on public needs
as they are identified: 'We have had occasion to extend the doctrine
beyond navigational and commercial fishing rights to include 'incidental
rights of fishing, boating, swimming, water skiing, and other related
recreational purposes'. Resolution of this case does not require us to
decide the total scope of the doctrine."23 The, court expressly declined to
place any limits on the doctrine, thus leaving the door open for further
expansion to cover other public interests such as biodiversity:
Mhe public trust devolved to the states upon gaming
statehood and is a trust that the state legislature '[cannot]
relinquish by a transfer of the property' ... We have
repeatedly stated that the sale of... tidelands, like other
20. IdL at 367 (quoting People v. Californa Fish Co., 138 P. 79 (Cal. 1913)).
21. 747 P.2d 1062,1072 (Wash. 1987).
22. Id. at 1083.
23. rd. at 1073 (quoting Wilbour v. Gallagher, 77 Wash. 2d 306, 316, 462P.2d 232 (1969),
cert. denied, 400 U.. 878 (1970)).
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trust property, is subject to the paramount public right of
navigation and fishery.24
III STATES ARE MANAGERS OF THE PUBiC TRUST DOCrRIm ON
PUBiC AS WELL AS PRiVATE LAND
From 1896 to 1979, federal courts upheld regulation of wildlife as
resources held in common under Geer v. Connecticut,25 which affirmed
the ownership of all wildlife by the state as an incident of sovereignty
However, in Hughes v. Oklahoma,2 6 the Court overruled the "legal
fiction' of state ownership of wild animals while simultaneously
affirning the legitimacy of pervasive state regulation for conservation and
protection of wild animals, provided that the regulation did not
impermissibly restrict interstate commerce. The Hughes Court held that
banning the export of "natural" minnows from the State was an
unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce.27 Shortly after Hughes,
In re Steuart Transportation Co. applied the public trust doctnne to
wildlife, declaring that "the State of Virginia and the United States have
the right and duty to protect and preserve the public's interest in natural
wildlife resources." 28 Likewise, the California Supreme Court recently
asserted that "[w]ild fish have always been recognized as a species of
property the general right and ownership of which is in the people of the
State."2 9
Today, the most widespread application of the doctrine continues
to be to the beds of navigable waters and the tidelands or shorelands, up
to the mean high tide line. Implementation of the doctrine has increased
substantially over the past 25 years and explicitly or implicitly
encompasses hundreds of different factual scenarios.30
24. Id. at 1072 (citing Long S ult Dev. Co. v. Call, 242 U.S. 272, 279 (1916)).
25. 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
26. 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
27. Id. at 337-38.
28. 495 F. Supp. 38,40 (E.D. Va. 1980).
29. California Trout, Inc. v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 255 Cal. Rptr. 184, 211
(Cal. CL. App. 1989).
30. Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural
Resources: Questioning the Public TrustDoctnne, 71 IowAL. REV. 631,632-33 (1986).
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IV. PUBuC AND PRIVATE LAND
Publicly and privately owned land are both covered by the public
trust doctrine.31 Thus, state agencies must manage state property in a
manner consistent with the doctrine. Privately owned land remains
subject to the doctrine even though the deed conveying it from the state
into private ownership says nothing about the public trust doctnne.32
Most states have coastal management acts of some kind because of the
incentive provided by the Federal Coastal Zone Management Act 3 3 The
states also own land in a proprietary capacity, such as state parks and
recreation areas. These state lands must be managed consistent with the
requirements of the public trust doctrine.
On private lands the public trust doctrine imposes a burden akin
to an easement as to public trust interests. 34 Regulations that control this
easement do not normally raise constitutional takings questions because
the easement exists prior to and in derogation of the landowner's title or
other vested right.35 This easement is owned by the state in trust for all
its citizens. In fact, the doctrine itself defines the scope of the private
owner's title. Thus, the doctrine is a property law rule that describes and
limits a private owner's right to use public trust resources. It may also
limit upland uses that adversely impact public trust resources.36
V. INER s PROTCiD BY THB DOCtRINE
The classic list of protected interests includes navigation,
commerce and fisheries. 37 The doctrine has been broadened to include
wildlife that depend on navigable waters or their tributaries.38 In
Department of Environmental Protection v. Jersey Central Power &
Light Co.,39 the court asserted the state's obligation to provide the public
31. See, eg.,supranote21 and accompanying text.
32. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
33. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-64 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
34. See Orion Corp. v. State, 747 P.2d 1062,1072 (Wash. 1987).
35. Id.
36. See e.g., National Audubon Soe'y v. Supenor Court of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709
(Cal. 1983).
37. Orion, 747 P.2d at 1073.
38. United States v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 227 Cal. Rptr. 161, 201 (Cal. CL
App. 1986).
39. 336 A.2d 750, 759 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 351 A.2d
337 (NJ. 1976).
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a viable marine environment. In Marks v. Whitney, the California court
applied the doctrine in an even broader, more ecologically oriented
context:
[O]ne of the most important public uses of the tidelands-
a use encompassed within the tidelands trust-is the
preservation of those lands in their natural state, so that
they may serve as ecological units for scientific study, as
open space, and as environments which provide food and
habitat for birds and marine life, and which favorably
affect the scenery and climate of the area.40
This widely cited case and language clearly is broad enough to include
biodiversity.
The "Mono Lake" decision in California resulted in protection of
the brine shrimp in the lake 4 1 The lake is used by birds for nesting and
feeding. One of the more interesting aspects of the case is that the court
found that extraction of water by Los Angeles from tributaries of the lake
would gradually lower the lake level 4 2 This would reduce the
assimilative capacity of the lake. The water would also become more
saline, which would decimate the brine shrimp population, wich would
in turn harm the bird population (the California Gull especially) by
reducing the food supply 43 In effect, this is a pollution case showing that
the public trust doctrine applies to protect the food supply of birds and
overrides vested rights under the prior appropriation system. Another
aspect of the case is important here. By lowering the lake level, islands
became isthmuses. The birds' nests and eggs on these former islands
became available to predators such as foxes, coyotes and raccoons who
could now reach them by land bridges. The California court made it clear
that even existing vested appropriative rights were subject to the call of
the public trust doctrine.44 The court said, "[i]n exercising its sovereign
power to allocate water resources in the public interest, the state is not
confined by past allocation decisions which may be incorrect in light of
current knowledge or inconsistent with current needs." 45 The court also
40. Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374,380 (Cal. 1971).
41. NatfonaIAudubon Soc'y, 658 P.2d at709.
42. Id at715.
43. Id.




provided that the state, as trustee of the public trust, retains supervisory
control over its waters4 6 It "prevents any party from acquirng a vested
right to appropriate water in a manner harmful to the interests protected
by the public trust."47 In view of the expansive interpretation of the
public trust doctrine rendered by contemporary courts, new courts
addressing the public trust doctrine should find it easy to embrace the
doctrine with special zest when state or private actions threaten or
endanger a species or when significant damage is threatened to wildlife or
habitat.
VI. THE PuBLIc TRusT DocRINEIS AJUDICIAL Dcm
The public trust doctrine is fundamentally a judicial doctrine.
Courts decide whether and to what extent it applies in a given state. This
aspect of the doctrine is critically important where political groups (such
as irrigated agriculture) have sufficient political power to kill legislation
protecting biodiversity. Once the courts of a state have adopted or
approved the public trust doctrine it becomes the "law of the state" like
other aspects of property law. As a rule of property law, it binds state
agencies as well as private parties. Thus, when issuing permits for state
projects and other actions, state agencies should consider the impact of
their action on public trust interests. They should take appropriate action
to protect public trust interests, and to minimize harm either entirely or to
the maximum extent practicable.
The state agencies in the state of California appear to have gone
the farthest in authorizing and requiring application of the public trust
doctrine in their administrative actions. 48 In United States v. State Water
Resources Control Board, the California court found that agricultural
water extractions from the Sacramento and San Joaquin rivers had
damaged the fresh water delta where the two rivers joined to flow into
San Francisco Bay.49 The California Court of Appeal ruled that the
Water Board could rely on the public trust doctrine to require that
irrigators work out a program which would allow more water to run
46. Id. at 727.
47. Id.
48. See United States v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 227 Cal. Rptr. 161 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1986).
49. Id. at 172-73.
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through the delta in order to renew its fresh water quality.50 Such a
program would almost certainly impinge on various irrigator's vested
appropnative rights. But the court ruled that the reduction of excessive
withdrawals could be ordered, even though they might reduce "vested"
rights extractions.
As the importance of protecting biodiversity becomes better
understood by the public, the courts, and state agencies, this pervasive
obligation on state agencies has a great potential for protecting
biodiversity.
VII. STATUTORY ANALOGUES OF THE PuBLIc TRUST DOCrRiNE
Section 303 of the Clean Water Act,51 which allows states to set
water quality standards, is a statutory expression of state control over the
commons that functions much like the public trust doctrine. Water
quality standards consist of designated uses and pollutant criteria based
on those uses.52 National Pollution Discharge Elimination System
permits, required for pollution discharge into surface waters, are written
to comply with water quality standards.53 These standards protect the
public interest in water quality.
The most powerful statutory expression protecting biodiversity is
found in the Endangered Species Act. 54 This Act stands as a dynamic
supporter for judicial implementation of the public trust doctrine. The
famous "snail darter" decision of the United States Supreme Court
illustrates the power of this congressional support of biodiversity.55
Congress had authorized and funded construction of Tellico Dam as part
of the Tennessee Valley Authority program. The dam was actually
completed and ready to flood when the Secretary of Interior designated
the snail darter as an endangered species. 56 The Supreme Court upheld
the stoppage in view of the unequivocal language of the Act, designed to
50. Id. at 201-02.
51. 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (1988).
52. Id. § 1313(c)(2)(a).
53. Id. § 1312.
54. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44(1988).
55. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. HiI1, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
56. 40 Fed. Reg. 47,505 (1975).
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protect endangered species. The Court said that "Congress intended
endangered species to be afforded the highest of priorities." 57
The Endangered Species Act is a statutory expression of national
policy favoring protection of endangered or threatened species. While
this Act protects only endangered or threatened species, the public trust
doctrine steps in much earlier and tends to protect species before they
meet the strict and dire criteria of the Endangered Species Act. The
fundamental underlying theme of the public trust doctrine is that animals
and birds should be protected anytime, and all the time, from unnecessary
harm or damage. Common sense urges that courts press the public trust
doctrine ever more aggressively, in proportion to the degree of danger to a
species.
The Marine Mammal Protection Act58 and the Wild and Scenic
Rivers Act59 both contain elements that protect biodiversity and support
the implementation of public trust doctrine jurisprudence. In addition, a
district court in Florida recently characterized the Submerged Lands
Act60 as a piece of legislation intended to "further the Public Trust
Doctrine."61 While the Submerged Lands Act gave the states title to all
lands beneath navigable waters, subject to the federal government's
navigational servitude,62 the court found that Congress intended to
decentralize management of the coastal areas to foster management more
adapted to local needs.63
Bioiversity should be implemented by arguing before the courts
that it should be considered as part of the common property law of the
state. This can be done either by the state or by private citizens. Any
citizen of a state has standing to raise the question, since any injury to
public property is by definition an injury to the citizen. The Attorney
General has standing as the chief legal representative of the citizens of the
state.
57. Tennessee Valley Auth., 437 U.S. at 174.
58. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407(1988 &Supp.V 1993).
59. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-87 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
60. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-56 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
61. Murphy v. Department of Natural Resources, 837 F. Supp. 1217, 1221 (S.D. Fa.
1993).
62. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1314(a).
63. Murphy, 837 F. Supp. at 1221.
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VUF CONCLUSION
The trend has been to broaden the interests protected by the public
trust doctrine. Nonetheless, most courts still restrict the doctrine to littoral
ecosystems, particularly wildlife that depend on the water or beds of
rivers, lakes, or the sea. No court has directly protected plant life, though
one could argue convincingly that wildlife cannot be protected unless
their habitat is protected also. A holistic view of the public commons
necessarily includes wildlife and the plants they eat. The long-heralded
biological survey promises to accumulate the information necessary for
legislation protecting biodiversity This would be the most efficient way
to achieve concrete protections. In the meantime, however, recourse to
the courts is necessary to stem the tide of species extinction.
Strengthening current public trust caselaw through strategic litigation,
focusing initially on states where the doctrine is already strong, could be a
successful tactic to edge the courts towards liberating the doctrine from its
aquatic chains. As the importance of protecting biodiversity becomes
better understood by the public, the courts, and state agencies, tius
pervasive obligation has a great potential for protecting biodiversity.
[Vol. 8
